The Comparative African Regional Economics of Globalization in Financial Allocation Efficiency by Asongu, Simplice & Tchamyou, Vanessa
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Comparative African Regional
Economics of Globalization in Financial
Allocation Efficiency
Simplice Asongu and Vanessa Tchamyou
December 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71173/
MPRA Paper No. 71173, posted 8 May 2016 07:17 UTC
 1 
 
 
AFRICAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
INSTITUTE 
 
 
 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
WP/15/053 
 
 
The Comparative African Regional Economics of Globalization in Financial 
Allocation Efficiency 
 
 
Simplice  A. Asongu
a 
 & Vanessa S. Tchamyou
ab 
 
a
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P. O. Box 8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon 
E-mails: asongus@afridev.org /  simenvanessa@afridev.org 
 
b 
University of Liège, HEC-Management School, 
Rue Louvrex 14, Bldg. N1, B-4000 Liège, Belgium 
E-mail: vsimen@doct.ulg.ac.be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
2015 African Governance and Development Institute                                                   WP/15/053 
 
 
AGDI Working Paper 
 
Research Department  
 
The Comparative African Regional Economics of Globalization in Financial Allocation 
Efficiency 
 
Simplice A. Asongu
 
 & Vanessa S. Tchamyou
 
 
December 2015 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The study assesses the role of globalization-fuelled regionalization policies on financial allocation 
efficiency in four economic and monetary regions in Africa for the period 1980 to 2008. Banking 
system and financial system efficiencies are used as dependent variables whereas seven bundled and 
unbundled globalization variables are employed as independent indicators. The bundling exercise is 
achieved by means of principal component analysis while the empirical evidence is based on 
interactive Fixed Effects regressions. The following findings are established. First, financial 
allocation efficiency is more sensitive to financial openness compared to trade openness and most 
sensitive to globalization. The relationship between allocation efficiency and globalization-fuelled 
regionalization policies is: (i) Kuznets or inverted U-shape in the UEMOA and CEMAC zones 
(evidence of decreasing returns to allocation efficiency from globalization-fuelled regionalization) 
and (ii) U-shape overwhelmingly in the COMESA and scantily in the EAC (increasing returns to 
allocation efficiency from globalization-fuelled regionalization). Established shapes are relevant to 
specific globalization dynamics within regions. ‘Economic and monetary’ regions are more prone to 
surplus liquidity than purely economic regions. Policy implications and measures of fighting surplus 
liquidity are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: A10 ; D60 ; E40 ; O10 ; P50 
Keywords: Globalization; Financial Development; Regional Integration; Panel; Africa 
 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction  
 There are at least three motives for positioning an inquiry on the comparative African 
regional economics of globalization in financial allocation efficiency, notably: growing relevance of 
regional integration; substantially documented concerns of surplus liquidity and ongoing debates 
surrounding the effects of globalization
1
.  
 First, consistent with Asongu (2013a), integrated economies have a plethora of advantages, 
namely: more efficiency in capital allocation (see Chen et al., 2002); stimulation of cross-border flow 
of funds, improved volumes of trade transactions, more market liquidity, lower cost for investors 
(Kim et al., 2005); financial stability owing to minimization of the probability for asymmetric shocks 
(see. Umutlu et al., 2010) and amelioration of the capacity of economies to absorb shocks (see. Yu et 
al., 2010). These advantages, inter alia, have motivated a growing stream of literature on economic 
integration in Africa (Njifen, 2014; Kayizzi-Mugerwa et al., 2014; Akpan, 2014)
2
. Second, financial 
intermediary development in Africa is seriously being limited by the substantially documented 
concerns of surplus liquidity that are constraining optimal transformation of mobilised deposits into 
credit for economic operators (see Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014a).  
 The recent global financial and European Monetary Unions (EMU) crises have reignited the 
debate about potential advantages from liberalisation and regionalisation, especially within the 
framework of financial allocation efficiency in developing countries (Asongu, 2013b). Some authors 
are of the position that the recent global financial crisis has substantially unravelled the drawbacks of 
regionalisation and liberalisation because, many developing economies which had previously 
experienced surges in inflows of foreign capital  have had to also experience a sharp reversal in the 
same flows (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009; Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014b). In essence, financial 
channels that have fuelled the global economic turmoil have resurfaced issues surrounding the lofty 
appeals of globalisation and corresponding externalities (e.g. of volatility and growth) in 
undeveloped countries
3
.  
                         
1
 Openness and globalisation are used interchangeably throughout the study.  
2
 Other recent studies within this stream of literature include: Baricako and Ndongo (2014);  Ebaidalla and Yahia (2014); 
Charaf-Eddine and Strauss (2014); Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014); Ofa and Karingi (2014); Shuaibu (2015) and 
Tumwebaze  and Ijjo (2015). 
3
 The benefits of globalization to developing countries are still subject to heated debate.  Though there is more consensus 
on the positive welfare effects of openness (Spatareanu & Manole, 2010; Welch &  Romain, 2008), some authors still 
caution on the need to progressively lift trade barriers only in tandem with economic development (Henry, 2007). Capital 
and trade account openness (globalization) are perceived by many authors not only as a source of growth, but also as a 
means to financial development (Baltagi et al., 2009; Hanh, 2010). 
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 The sceptical strand starkly contrasts with the theoretical appeals of   globalisation and 
regionalisation, which are expected to be high in developing nations.  From a theoretical perspective, 
globalisation/regionalisation should promote international/regional risk sharing and efficient 
allocation of capital. These potential rewards are expected to be higher in developing nations 
compared to their developed counterparts because poor countries are labour-rich but scarce in capital. 
Hence      given their higher marginal productivity of capital, globalisation/regionalisation enables the 
flow of capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. Moreover, developing countries are also 
expected to enjoy higher welfare gains because they are characterised with more volatile output 
compared to their developed counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014b).  
 The current wave of regionalisation/globalisation efforts began in the 1980s with growing 
cross border trade and financial flows between advanced and developing nations. The integration 
processes were facilitated by the liberalisation of capital controls in many nations because it was 
estimated that growing cross-border flows would engender substantial rewards in capital allocation 
and enhanced international risk-sharing possibilities.  According to Kose et al. (2006),     many 
developing countries quickly embraced integration polices because the anticipated rewards were 
higher for developing countries compared to developed nations. Unfortunately, the surge in financial 
flows was associated with financial and currency crises in the late 1980s and 1990s.The pattern of 
these crises motivated a stream of scholars to start advocating that compared to developed countries, 
developing nations which liberalised their capital and trade accounts have been more affected by 
global crises (see Henry, 2007; Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013b).   
 Contemporary literature on the effect of globalisation on financial development has failed to 
engage the comparative economics of regional integration in African countries.  The Henry (2007) 
and Kose et al. (2011) hypothesis for initial financial development conditions  for financial 
development benefits from financial globalisation has been investigated by Asongu (2014b) and 
Asongu and De Moor (2015ab) who have established threshold conditions for the rewards of 
financial globalisation in financial development.  In the post-crisis literature, Price and Elu (2014) 
have concluded that credit contraction during the 2008-2009 financial crises has been associated with 
more adverse growth externalities in sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations that belong to the CFA 
(French African Colonies) currency union. Asongu (2013c) has investigated real and monetary policy 
convergence in the CFA zone in light of the EMU crisis and concluded on a substantial absence of 
the convergence needed for policy harmonization in common responses to serious disequilibria. 
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Motelle and Biekpe (2015) have examined whether enhanced financial integration is the source of 
domestic financial sector instability to confirm the Kose et al. (2011) hypothesis within the 
framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Asongu et al. (2015a) have 
extended Price and Elu (2014) and Motelle and Biekpe (2015) in the context of pre- and post-crisis 
effects of financial globalization in domestic financial development to confirm the contemporary 
relevance of the debate on the rewards of liberalization. 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked in a plethora of structural and 
policy adjustments that had as ultimate goal to stimulate financial development and economic growth 
(Janine & Elbadawi, 1992; Asongu, 2013b). In the first generation of reforms, the policies that were 
adopted consisted of: abolishing explicit controls on the allocation and price of credit, allowance of 
interest rates to be determined by the market, reduction of direct government intervention in bank 
credit decisions and relaxation of controls on international capital flows (see Asongu, 2013b). Second 
generation reforms targeted institutional and structural constraints, namely: (i) enhancement of 
regulatory, legal, institutional and supervisory environments; (ii) restoration of bank soundness and 
(iii) rehabilitation of financial infrastructure (Batuo et al., 2010; Batuo & Asongu, 2015). 
 Unfortunately, in spite of two decades of globalization-fuelled regionalization policies and 
reforms in the financial sector, African economies have not achieved remarkable progress in tackling 
substantially documented concerns of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 
2014a). Hence, the positioning of this inquiry on financial allocation efficiency is justified by an 
apparent policy syndrome on the one hand and a missing link in the literature on the other hand. On 
the latter contribution, whereas a substantial body of the literature has investigated the effect of 
financial reforms on financial development (see Cho et al., 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & 
Kupukile, 2010), to the best of our knowledge, literature on financial efficiency has been scarce. 
Moreover, the concept of financial efficiency has not been conceived within framework of the 
fundamental mission of banking institutions which is to transform mobilized deposits into credit for 
economic operators (see Ataullah et al., 2004; Saxegaard, 2006; Al-Obaidan, 2008; Kiyato, 2009; 
Kablan, 2010). Some mainstream measurements of financial efficiency in the African literature 
include: cost efficiency (see Chen, 2009; Mensah et al., 2012); profit efficiency (see Hauner & Peiris, 
2005) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for technical efficiency (see Kablan, 2009). 
Kukenova (2011, p.1) has suggested that may be the principal hurdle in assessing the nexus between 
 6 
liberalization and allocation efficiency is traceable to the fact that capital allocation efficiency is not 
directly observable.  
 In the light of the above, the contribution of this study to the literature is twofold, notably, in 
the: (i) definition, conception and measurement of financial allocation efficiency and focus on a 
continent with severe concerns of surplus liquidity in financial institutions and (ii) comparative 
analysis of regionalization policies owing to ongoing efforts of regional integration across the 
continent. First, the conception of efficiency is contrary to the two mainstream measurements of 
financial allocation efficiency, namely: (i) the efficiency of decision making by means of DEA
4
 and 
(ii) Overall Economic Efficiency (OEE) with regard to scale and technical efficiencies
5
 or 
profitability- and cost-related perspectives
6
.   In essence, the conception of allocation efficiency 
adopted in this study appreciates the ability of financial institutions to transform mobilized financial 
deposits into credit for economic operators. Hence, this measurement is consistent with the discussed 
policy syndrome of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions. Second, the study 
simultaneously contributes to the ongoing debate on the effects of globalization and the evolving 
stream of literature on regionalization in Africa by assessing the effects of regionalization policies on 
financial allocation efficiency. For this purpose, the timing of regionalization policies is specifically 
tailored to comparatively investigate whether regionalization has improved or reduced financial 
allocation efficiency.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the debates on financial 
allocation. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results while Section 5 concludes with implications and future directions.  
 
 
 
                         
4
 The interested reader can refer to, among others: Ataullah et al. (2004) who have employed the DEA approach to assess 
the scale and technical efficiencies of financial institutions in Pakistan and India. Also see Kablan (2009).  
5
 We invite the interested reader to consult Al-Obaidan (2008) who has employed a composite indicator for banking 
system efficiency in the Gulf region to establish that openness improves technical efficiency. 
6
 This is in accordance with recent literature on financial efficiency in Africa (see Kiyato, 2009; Kablan, 2010). Four 
main variables on financial efficiency have been discussed in the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt & Beck, 2009; Asongu, 
2012ab). “They include: the ratio of bank deposits (which measures the extent to which savings can fund private credit), 
the net interest margin (which is the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenues as a share of its total assets), 
overhead cost (or the accounting value of the bank’s overhead cost as a share of its total assets) and, cost/income ratio 
(which assesses overhead costs relative to revenues)” (Asongu, 2013b, p.665). Whereas the last-three are related to 
profitability, the concept of efficiency employed in this study is the first.   
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2.   Brief debate on financial allocation efficiency  
 In accordance with Asongu (2013b), the decision on whether to adopt integration/ 
liberalization in order to facilitate financial allocation efficiency and enjoy benefits of regional/ 
international risk sharing has been much debated in policy and academic circles. In essence, there are 
two main narratives on the relevance of integration as a policy choice by developing nations in their 
attempts to benefit from capital allocation efficiency.  
 The first argument which supports the rewards of ‘allocation efficiency’ relies heavily on the 
predictions of neoclassical growth models from the seminal studies of Solow (1956). According to 
the neoclassical growth model, liberalization and integration policies enable efficient allocation of 
capital because resources flow from developed countries that are characterized with capital 
abundance to developing countries that are scarce in capital but rich in labour. Moreover, the return 
of capital is low (high) in developed (developing) countries. The bulk of literature on this perspective 
is broadly consistent with the advantages that developing countries might enjoy, namely: reduction of 
capital cost, improvements in investment and economic prosperity that ultimately enhance living 
standards permanently (see Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 2000; Batuo & 
Asongu, 2015). Hence, arguments on gains in ‘allocation efficiency’ have been used by developing 
countries to justify their adoptions of liberalization and regionalization policies, from Santiago to 
Seoul over the past decades (Asongu, 2014b).  
 The second strand is of the perspective that the argument of ‘allocation efficiency’ is a 
fanciful means by which to extend the gains from international trade in commodities to international 
trade in financial assets. According to this strand, the predictions of ‘allocation efficiency’ are 
apparent only in the absence of distortions from the free movement of capital. Hence, given the 
distortions experienced by developing countries during financial crises, there is some inconsistency 
between the reality of liberalization policies and the theoretical predictions of the neoclassical model. 
Within this framework, some notable studies that best articulate this perspective include: provocative 
titles like ‘Who Needs Capital Account Convertibility?’ (Rodrik, 1998) and ‘Why did financial 
globalization disappoint?’  (Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009). According to the narrative, the 
correlation between globalization and allocation efficiency is not very apparent because of costs 
incurred from recurrent financial crises which far outweigh potential benefits (Rodrik, 1998).  
 Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) have documented that in the wake of the recent sub-prime 
crisis, arguments about the externalities of financial engineering generating substantial gains in 
 8 
developing countries are less plausible. According to the narrative, even without the financial crisis, 
at the international level, it is increasingly evident that the rewards of integration/globalization/ 
liberalization are not apparent
7
. The narrative further maintains that the postulated gains in terms of 
higher investment and growth in less developed countries are hard to find because countries that have 
been developing remarkably have been those that have relied less on liberalization. Therefore, 
globalization policies have not smoothened consumption and reduced volatility as hypothesized.  
Another perspective argues that: the rewards of globalization today are unpersuasive, speculative and 
indirect (Asongu, 2014b) and it is time for new paradigm shift in liberalization policies because more 
from globalization is not necessarily better (Asongu, 2013b). In the light of above literature, the 
hypothesis investigated by this study is as follows: the policy of regionalization increases financial 
allocation efficiency.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Globalization, financial and control variables  
 We assess economic and monetary regional panels with data from the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) and African Development Indicators (ADI) of the 
World Bank for the period 1980 to 2008. Financial variables are obtained from the FDSD whereas 
macroeconomic variables are from ADI. Two financial allocation efficiency indicators are used, 
namely: (i) banking system efficiency measured with ‘banking system credit on banking system 
deposits’ and (ii) financial system efficiency proxied with ‘financial system credit on financial 
system deposits’. The allocation efficiency variables appreciate the ability of banks to transform 
mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators (see Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1999; Demirgüç-
Kunt & Beck, 2009; Asongu, 2013a).  
 Three openness indicators are used, namely: financial openness, trade openness and 
globalization. Trade openness consists of three measurements: Imports, Exports and ‘Imports plus 
Exports’. Financial openness is made-up of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Private Capital Flows 
                         
7
 The position is still subject to intense debate. Some arguments include: (i) Leung (2003) concluding that increasing 
external debts in developing countries is worsening business cycles; (ii) Mulwa et al. (2009) suggesting that liberalization 
has not resulted in improved productivity and efficiency in developing countries and (iii) Kholdy and Sohrabian (2008) 
establishing that financial globalization may be associated with negative governance externalities in developing countries 
and (iv) Asongu et al. (2015b) concluding that globalization-driven debts are contributing to reducing inclusive human 
development in African countries.  
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(PCF) and a composite index from FDI and PCF. The globalization variable is the composite index of 
financial openness and trade openness. These composite indicators are derived by means of principal 
component analysis. The definitions and classification of variables in Appendices 1-2 are consistent 
with recent openness and finance literature.  The financial openness variables are in line with Lane 
and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) and Baltagi et al. (2009) while the composite financial and trade openness 
indicators are in accordance with Gries et al. (2009) and Hanh (2010).  
 Selected control variables are consistent with recent financial development literature, 
namely: GDP growth, inflation, public investment and foreign aid (Asongu, 2014b; Asongu & De 
Moor, 2015). The relationship between economic growth and financial development has been 
substantially documented in the literature. First, a growing economy is linked to reduced cost of 
financial intermediation because of inter alia: availability of more funds for productive investments 
and competition (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Saint-Paul, 1992). This relationship has been 
confirmed in more contemporary literature (Levine, 1997, 2003ab). Second, both empirical (Boyd et 
al., 2001) and theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) views maintain that higher levels of inflation are 
associated with less efficient, less active and smaller financial institutions. Essentially, 
macroeconomic policies conducive to low/stable inflation and higher levels of investment have been 
documented to be associated with higher levels of financial development (Asongu, 2014b; Asongu & 
De Moor, 2015).  Third, a positive relationship between investment and financial development has 
also been established in the literature (Huang, 2011). Fourth, the theoretical basis supporting policies 
of development assistance towards developing countries is to mitigate the investment-financing gap 
(see Easterly, 2005). However, from a practical standpoint, the impact of foreign aid on domestic 
financial development can also be negative if a substantial chunk of donor funds is: (i) siphoned by 
corrupt officials in recipients nations and subsequently deposited in tax havens whose jurisdictions 
are traceable to the donor community and (ii) spent in donor countries.    
 The summary statistics and correlation matrices are disclosed in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 
respectively. From the summary statistics, it is apparent that the variables are quite comparable on the 
basis of means. Moreover, the substantial degree of variation from corresponding standard deviations 
is an indication that reasonable estimated linkages should be expected. Given that imports, exports 
and trade openness variables are in tens whereas some indicators are in decimals, we define the 
dependent variables both in ratio and percentage in order to account for this slight difference in 
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denomination. Hence, banking system efficiency is in ratio whereas financial system efficiency is in 
percentage.  
This variation in the demonization of the dependent variables does not affect their degrees of 
substitutions in Appendix 4, since corresponding correlation coefficients of the two variables are: 
98.50% (Panel A), 92.50% (Panel B), 89.90% (Panel C) and 94.20% (Panel D) for the UEMOA, 
CEMAC, COMESA and EAC respectively
8
.  Hence, the purpose of the correlation matrices is to 
avoid concerns of multicollinearity. The concern in the financial development variables is not much 
of an issue because they are employed as dependent variables. Moreover, the concern in openness 
variables is addressed by employing them in distinct specifications. Given that the specification 
consists of interactive regressions, it is important to note that contrary to linear additive models, 
multicollinearity is an issue with interactive models (see Brambor et al., 2006; Asongu & De Moor, 
2015ab). This is essentially because the effect of the interactive policy variable of regionalization is 
considered as a conditional marginal impact.   
 
3.1.2 Categorization of regions and determination of regionalization policy dummies 
 As shown in Table 1 below, there are eleven main economic and/or monetary regions in 
Africa, namely, the:  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA); Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS); Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC); Franc Zone (CEMAC 
plus UEMOA countries)
9
; South African Development Community (SADC);  East African Community 
(EAC); South African Customs Union (SACU); Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA);  Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Arab Maghreb Union 
(UMA). The policy dummies are from the year when regionalization policies become effective.  
 ECOWAS, The Franc Zone, SADC, SACU, IGAD and UMA are not retained for our study 
because with respect to their creation dates, data was either unavailable or very limited for the 
application of a policy-time-dummy estimation technique. For the remaining economic and/or 
monetary unions, as shown in Table 2, we are further constrained by unavailability of data to narrow- 
down the number of countries in the database to the following: (i) Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger 
and Senegal are retained for the UEMOA region; (ii) Cameroon, Gabon and Congo Republic for the 
                         
8
 UEMOA: West African Economic and Monetary Union. CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa. COMESA: Common Market for East and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community.  
9
 Whereas, the WAEMU and CEMAC are within the Franc Zone, we can take a minimalistic approach by also 
considering them are distinct economic/monetary zones because they have different central banks.  
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CEMAC zone; (iii) Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda make-up the EAC and (iv) Burundi, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia for the COMESA.  
 
     Table 1: Presentation of regions with corresponding balanced panels 
Regions Definition (Number of member 
states) 
Constituent countries(Founding date) Panel/ 
Dummy  
ECOWAS 
(CDEAO) 
Economic Community of West 
African States. (15) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde(1976), Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone , Togo,  
Mauritania(2000).  (5/1975)                                                                         
 
N/A 
 
UEMOA 
West African Economic and 
Monetary Union(8)           
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau 
(5/1997) °, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. (1/1994) 
(80-08) 
/(94-08) 
ECCAS 
(UDEAC)* 
Economic Community of 
Central African States(11) 
Angola(1999)°, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, D.R.Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe.( 1985) 
(90-08)/ 
(99-08) 
 
CEMAC 
Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa(6) 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. (1999) 
(90-08)/ 
(99-08) 
 
Franc 
ZONE 
 
CEMAC plus UEMOA (14) 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo(9/1939) 
 
N/A 
 
SADC 
 
South  African Development 
Community (15) 
Angola, Botswana, D.R Congo(1997)°, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius(1995)°, Mozambique, Namibia (1990)°, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa(1990)°, Seychelles(2004-2007°) and 
Madagascar(2005)° (1980) 
 
 
N/A 
SACU  South Africa Customs Union( 4) South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. (1970) N/A 
EAC  East African Community (5) Burundi (2007), Kenya, Rwanda (2007), Tanzania and 
Uganda. (2001) 
(90-08)/ 
(02-08) 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (19) 
Burundi, Comoros, D.R Congo, Djibouti, Egypt(1999)°, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya(2006)°, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles(2001)°, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.(1994)   
 
(80-08) 
/(95-08) 
IGAD Intergovernmental  Authority on 
Development (7) 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea (1993)°, Kenya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda. (1986) 
N/A 
UMA  Arab Maghreb  Union (5) Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania (1989) N/A 
Countries with dates in brackets are non-founding members. Countries in Italics have withdrawn their membership. °: countries not considered for panel 
because they entered the region very late or withdrew over time. N/A; denotes the region cannot be include in the study because creation date renders data 
incompatible with application of a policy-time dummy technique.* Founded  in 1985 but became effective only by 1999.    
 In the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Burundi, Cameroon, 
Congo Republic, Gabon and Rwanda are selected. However after analysis, we are unable to check for 
robustness because the financial-efficiency indicator used to assess results of the bank-efficiency 
proxy has a different degree of integration
10
.  
 
                         
10
 From an empirical point of view, the high correlation (88%) between banking system efficiency and financial system 
efficiency for ECCAS is a necessary but insufficient condition for a robustness test application. Compatibility of 
integration orders in endogenous variables is also crucial for the robustness check.  
 12 
Table 2:  Selected regions and countries  
Regions Selected countries  Panel Policy 
Dummy 
UEMOA Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Senegal 1980-08 1994-08 
COMESA Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia 
1980-08 1995-08 
CEMAC Cameron, Gabon, Congo Republic 1990-08 1999-08 
ECCAS Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gabon, Rwanda 1990-08 1999-08 
EAC Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 1990-08 2002-08 
         UEMOA: West African Economic and Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community. COMESA: Common Markets   
for Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community. We dropped ECCAS because of incompatibility of robustness test.  
 
 
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)  
 Given the high degree of substitution between globalization variables, we are consistent with 
recent literature in employing principal component analysis (PCA) to derive composite indicators 
(Andrés et al., 2015; Tchamyou, 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016). The PCA is a widely used 
technique to reduce a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated indicators 
called principal components (PCs) which represent a substantial proportion of information or 
variability in the constituent indicators. The criterion used to decide which information to retain is 
from Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) who have recommended that PCs with an eigenvalue greater 
than the mean or one should be retained.  
 Table 3 shows the derivation of composite indices. The eigenvalues and corresponding 
variations of retained first PCs are consistent with the criterion highlighted above. For example the 
financial globalisation indicator (Finopex) in Panel A for the UEMOA region which consists of FDI 
and PCF has an eigenvalue of 1.898 and accounts for about 94.9% of information in the constituent 
indicators.  
“We use PCA because we aim to reduce the observed correlated variables into a smaller set 
of independent and/or uncorrelated composite variables. In other words, we wish to extract linear 
composites of observed variables. Factor analysis is inappropriate because we are not testing a 
theoretical model of latent factors causing observed variables. Accordingly, it is consistent with the 
test for a theoretical model of latent factors causing observed variables” (Asongu, 2015, p. 12). 
 It is important to discuss the statistical relevance of the PC-derived globalisation indicators. 
These can be engaged at two levels, namely: general and specific points (Asongu &  Nwachukwu, 
2015ab). First, from a general perspective, Pagan (1984, p. 242) has documented an interesting 
analysis on concerns that could arise when regressors are obtained from initial estimations. The 
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underlying concerns are related to efficiency, consistency and inferential validity of estimated 
parameters. Whereas two-step estimators are reliable when it comes to consistency and efficiency, 
only few valid inferences may be provided by the underlying estimates. The concern about inferential 
validity has been confirmed by a stream of contemporary literature (Oxley & McAleer, 1993; Ba & 
Ng, 2006; McKenzie & McAleer, 1997; Westerlund & Urbain, 2013a).  
 
Table 3:  Derivation of Indices (Financial Openness and Globalization indices)  
Principal 
Indicator 
Indexes Cor. coef. 
(t-stats) 
Eigen 
Value 
First PC 
variation 
Component  Matrix 
Panel A: UEMOA 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.898***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(23.53) 1.898 0.949 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
0.199**   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(2.34) 1.199 0.599 0.707 0.707 
Panel B: COMESA 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.981***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(82.51) 1.981 0.990 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
0.250***   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(4.15) 1.250 0.625 0.707 0.707 
Panel C: CEMAC 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.994***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(64.94) 1.994 0.997 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
0.360**   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(2.58) 1.360 0.680 0.707 0.707 
Panel D: EAC 
Financial 
Openness  
 
Finopex 
0.996***   FDIgdp PCFgdp 
(88.912) 1.996 0.998 0.707 0.707 
Globalization  
Globex 
-0.352***   Finopex (I+X)gdp 
(-2.744) 1.352 0.676 -0.707 -0.707 
Globex: Globalization Index.  Finopex: Financial Openness Index.  FDIgdp and PCFgdp are capital account openness indicators. (I+X) gdp is the trade 
openness variable.  PC: Principal Component. Cor. Coef: Correlation coefficient. *, **, ***: are respectively 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels.  
  
 Second, on the specific angle, we are employing PC indicators within the framework of this 
study. Concerns about PC-derived variables have been documented by Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 
2013b) who have built on previous works highlighted in the preceding paragraph as well as more 
contemporary literature on the subject, notably: Stock and Watson (2002); Pesaran (2006); Bai (2003, 
2009) and Greenaway-McGrevy et al. (2012). The authors have cautioned that normal inferences can 
be made if PC-factor augmented estimators converge towards their values at the rate of  TN  
(where N represents cross-section observations and T denotes the number of time series). 
Furthermore, Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have argued that conditions for convergence 
required for good inferences from PC-derived estimators are more feasible when the sample is 
relatively large. Unfortunately, the authors have not disclosed how large should be large. Concerning 
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the sample used in the study, we can neither stretch T nor N for two reasons. First, N selected for the 
sampled economic and monetary regions is based data availability. Accordingly, economic regions 
by definition have a limited number of countries. Second, the adopted time series is tailored to 
increase T as much as possible. In essence, the policy time dummies are from the year when 
regionalization policies became effective. In addition to these clarifications, Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2015a) have recently concluded on the feasibility of inferences from PC-augmented regressors using 
sub-samples that are comparatively lower in terms of T and N values.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 The objective of this study is to assess post-regionalization policy effects. This requires the 
application of policy-time dummies which is by definition consistent with a fixed effects (FE) 
regression. The economic relevance of the FE regression is that it accounts for the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the sub-samples. In panel data analysis, the estimator from FE is also called a 
‘within estimator’and there is an assumption of time independent impacts for every country that is 
potentially correlated with the regressors.  
 Moreover, Dummy or Fixed-effect (FE) regressions have the added advantage of not 
hypothetically assuming that explanatory variables are not correlated with residuals. Furthermore, the 
use of FE accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity between countries in the region. More generally, 
in the literature, when a panel consists of observations on a fixed and relatively small sets of interest 
units (say member states of a given region), there is a presumption in favor of FE (see Asongu, 
2016). 
 In spite of this intuition for a FE estimator, we still employ the Hausman test to assess if the 
intuition for the estimation technique is consistent with the behavior of data. On whether Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) with FE or Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with FE should be applied, we opt 
for the latter and justify our choice after regression by testing for the significance of 
heteroskedasticity.   
 The adopted estimation is as follows in Eq. (1).  
    
  
tititih
h
htitititi WGPPGFE ,,,
4
1
,3,2,10,   
             
(1) 
 
Where: tiFE , , is either ‘banking system efficiency’ and ‘financial system efficiency’  of country i  
at  
period t ;  tiG ,  
is a globalisation indicator (imports, exports, trade openness, private capital flows, 
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foreign direct investment, financial globalisation (Finopex) and globalisation (Globex));   tiP ,  
is a 
regionalisation policy variable that may either take the values of 0 (before the regionalisation) or 1 
(after regionalisation) ;  tiPG ,  
is the interaction between globalisation and the regionalisation policy 
variable; 0 is a constant; 
W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, inflation, public 
investment and foreign aid),   i  is a country-specific effect, t

 
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  
the error term. The specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
consistent in standard errors. Moreover, specifications are tailored to avoid the potential issues of 
multicollinearity associated with globalisation indicators.  
 
4. Empirical analysis  
4.1 Presentation of results  
Tables 4-5 present estimated results. Whereas Table 4 discloses findings on the UEMOA 
(Panel A) and CEMAC (Panel B) regions, Table 5 shows results for the COMESA (Panel A) and 
EAC (Panel B) regions. Each panel consists of two sets of specifications, namely, regressions with: 
‘banking system efficiency’ on the left-hand-side (LHS) and estimations with ‘financial system 
efficiency’ on the right-hand-side (RHS).  
The following can be established from Panel A of Table 4 on the UEMOA region. First, 
whereas the effects imports, exports, trade openness and globalization are positive on banking system 
efficiency, the marginal effects from the interaction with regionalization are negative. This is 
evidence of decreasing returns to allocation efficiency from globalization-fuelled regionalization. 
Hence, it can be inferred that the effect of regionalization is likely to take a Kuznets or inverted U-
shape because the unconditional globalization estimates are positively significant whereas the 
unconditional effects based on an interaction with regionalization policy are negative. This evidence 
is supported by the unconditional negative effect from regionalization policy. Second, most of the 
significant control variables have expected signs. Third, findings from financial system efficiency on 
the RHS are consistent with those of banking system efficiency on the LHS. Fourth, the Hausman 
test confirms that the data behavior is consistent with the intuition for adopting a FE regression 
technique because the null hypothesis which is the position of Random Effects (RE) or between 
estimators is overwhelmingly rejected.  
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In Panel B of the same table for the CEMAC region: (i) unconditional regionalization 
variables have  negative effects on allocation efficiency; (ii) the marginal effect of globalization is 
negative on the LHS; (iii) most significant control variables display expected signs and (iv) the 
Hausman test does not validate the choice of a FE estimator.  
We clarify two concerns, notably: the negative effect from GDP growth and the relevance of 
a threshold effect for a Kuznets shape relationship from globalization on the LHS even when the 
unconditional effect from globalization is not significant. First, the negative impact of GDP growth 
could be traceable to the lack of broad-based growth in Africa. Accordingly, whereas prior to the mid 
1990s, the growth experienced by the continent was substantially low, the recent period of growth 
resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2014, p. 44) has been very immiserizing because an 
April 2015 World Bank report has revealed that from the 1990s extreme poverty has been decreasing 
in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 2015).   
Second, the notion of threshold is in accordance with Cummins (2000) on a minimum level in 
language proficiency before a second-language speaker can begin reaping the benefits from a given 
language. Moreover, the definition of threshold is also consistent with the critical mass theory that 
has been substantially covered in economic development studies (e.g. Roller & Waverman, 2001; 
Ashraf & Galor, 2013). Batuo (2015) has recently applied the threshold or critical mass theory using 
interactive variables. Therefore, within the framework of this inquiry, the notion of threshold is 
similar to the : (i) critical mass for positive/negative effects (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 
2015); (ii) minimum requirement for enjoying of positive/negative  effects (Cummins, 2000) and (iii) 
criteria for Kuznets and U shapes (Ashraf & Galor, 2013). 
 In Table 5 on the COMESA and EAC regions, the following findings are apparent. First, for 
the COMESA region, while the regionalisation policy coefficient is consistently negative, the 
marginal effects from interaction with globalisation are: (i) positive from trade globalisation and 
globalisation on the LHS and (ii) positive from all globalisation estimates on the RHS. The finding is 
exclusively consistent with the significant estimates from exports and trade openness on the LHS of 
Panel B on the EAC region. It follows that the relationship between banking efficiency and 
globalisation-fuelled regionalisation is likely to be U-shape for the COMESA and EAC regions.  
Third, the significant control variables display expected signs for the most part.  
 
 17 
Table 4: Interactive regression results for UEMOA and CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Regions) 
               
 Panel A: The UEMOA Region 
 Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
  Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex   Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex  
Constant 1.138*** 0.841*** 0.780*** 1.788*** 1.758*** 1.812*** 1.808*** 116.53*** 63.756*** 72.585*** 178.583*** 176.35*** 179.92*** 180.37*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imports  0.019*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.890*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002)       (0.002)       
Exports --- 0.031*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.827*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)       (0.000)      
Trade --- --- 0.015*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.651*** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.000)       (0.000)     
FDI --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.161 --- --- --- 
    (0.870)       (0.826)    
PCF --- --- --- --- 0.050 --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.731 --- --- 
     (0.302)       (0.557)   
Finopex --- --- --- --- --- 0.043 --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.795 --- 
      (0.488)       (0.642)  
Globex --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.337*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 32.717*** 
       (0.000)       (0.000) 
Policy  0.316 0.032   0.451** -0.706*** -0.718*** -0.720*** -0.769*** 22.064 7.074 42.717** -69.760*** -71.30*** -70.42*** -76.40*** 
 (0.180) (0.833) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.326) (0.612) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imports.Policy -0.030*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.720*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)       (0.000)       
Exports.Policy --- -0.028*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.986*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)       (0.000)      
Trade.Policy --- --- -0.018*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.847*** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.000)       (0.000)     
FDI.Policy --- --- --- 0.016 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.961 --- --- --- 
    (0.792)       (0.871)    
PCF.Policy --- --- --- --- -0.012 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.553 --- --- 
     (0.811)       (0.913)   
Finopex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- -0.007 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.310 --- 
      (0.909)       (0.962)  
Globex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.314*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -30.52*** 
       (0.000)       (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.00006 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.0007 -0.548 -0.714 -0.758 -0.395 -0.411 -0.407 -0.618 
 (0.992) (0.836) (0.733) (0.831) (0.835) (0.842) (0.899) (0.366) (0.205) (0.188) (0.544) (0.524) (0.530) (0.296) 
Inflation  0.007** 0.005 0.004 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.005 1.014*** 0.671** 0.645* 1.588*** 1.580*** 1.583*** 0.789** 
 (0.045) (0.110) (0.221) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.006) (0.048) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
Public Investment 0.013 0.018** 0.015* 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.009 1.111 1.754** 1.326* 1.350 1.398 1.336 0.666 
 (0.134) (0.040) (0.064) (0.104) (0.104) (0.120) (0.309) (0.202) (0.029) (0.094) (0.156) (0.136) (0.160) (0.433) 
Foreign Aid -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.021** -2.66*** -1.394* -1.875** -3.231*** -3.067*** -3.124*** -1.745** 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.058) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
Hausman test  25.23*** 21.77*** 25.11*** 27.14*** 26.24*** 26.60*** 19.02*** 28.11*** 26.19*** 27.86*** 30.79*** 30.02*** 30.31*** 22.67*** 
R² within 0.718 0.729 0.731 0.664 0.673 0.669 0.722 0.736 0.773 0.757 0.688 0.693 0.691 0.744 
Fisher 37.84*** 40.12*** 42.06*** 29.14*** 30.38*** 29.74*** 38.23*** 41.58*** 50.68*** 48.15*** 32.45*** 33.35*** 32.91*** 42.85*** 
Observations  116 116 120 115 115 115 115 116 116 120 115 115 115 115 
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 Panel B: The CEMAC Region 
 Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
  Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex   Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex  
Constant 0.731*** 1.148*** 1.183*** 1.031*** 1.040*** 1.079*** 1.138*** 91.805*** 122.03*** 126.75*** 103.02*** 103.42*** 105.15*** 107.47*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imports  0.012* --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.612 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.082)       (0.327)       
Exports --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.343 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.858)       (0.648))      
Trade --- --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.304 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.530)       (0.333)     
FDI --- --- --- 0.013 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.596 --- --- --- 
    (0.481)       (0.722)    
PCF --- --- --- --- 0.020 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.878 --- --- 
     (0.310)       (0.619)   
Finopex --- --- --- --- --- 0.084 --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.781 --- 
      (0.387)       (0.667)  
Globex --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.084 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.080 
       (0.518)       (0.994) 
Policy -0.237 -0.100 0.068 -0.225** -0.223** -0.295*** -0.314*** -17.473 -15.980 3.259 -20.621** -20.480** -25.51*** -25.610** 
 (0.237) (0.595) (0.733) (0.017) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.322) (0.329) (0.848) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) 
Imports.Policy -0.0009 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.287 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.867)       (0.558)       
Exports.Policy --- -0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.132 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.568)       (0.740)      
Trade.Policy --- --- -0.003 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.278 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.156)       (0.154)     
FDI.Policy --- --- --- -0.023 --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.711 --- --- --- 
    (0.224)       (0.310)    
PCF.Policy --- --- --- --- -0.030 --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.025 --- --- 
     (0.130)       (0.251)   
Finopex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- -0.135 --- --- --- --- --- --- -9.494 --- 
      (0.171)       (0.280)  
Globex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.183* --- --- --- --- --- --- -11.996 
       (0.079)       (0.193) 
GDP growth  -0.026** -0.029** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -3.024*** -2.975*** -3.350*** -3.556*** -3.573*** -3.560*** -3.944*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.010** -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.923** -0.696* -0.661* -0.608 -0.596 -0.602 -0.612 
 (0.019) (0.117) (0.114) (0.185) (0.195) (0.190) (0.151) (0.020) (0.087) (0.092) (0.170) (0.176) (0.173) (0.161) 
Public Investment -0.020 -0.008 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.004 -1.361 -0.680 0.110 0.109 0.031 0.080 -0.108 
 (0.168) (0.585) (0.926) (0.995) (0.923) (0.975) (0.800) (0.293) (0.618) (0.938) (0.948) (0.985) (0.961) (0.948) 
Foreign Aid -0.003 -0.0004 0.0007 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.102 0.089 0.248 0.226 0.227 0.225 0.040 
 (0.758) (0.968) (0.941) (0.899) (0.890) (0.897) (0.887) (0.906) (0.916) (0.772) (0.811) (0.809) (0.811) (0.966) 
Hausman test  1.48 0.79 2.70 0.35 0.35 0.33 1.37 0.92 1.55 3.51 0.81 0.82 0.80 2.15 
R² within 0.432 0.409 0.458 0.400 0.413 0.406 0.432 0.507 0.508 0.558 0.468 0.474 0.471 0.486 
Fisher 4.78*** 4.35*** 5.45*** 3.34*** 3.53*** 3.43*** 3.81*** 6.17*** 6.21*** 7.76*** 4.28*** 4.38*** 4.33*** 4.60*** 
Observations  54 54 55 45 45 45 45 52 52 53 44 44 44 44 
               
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Policy: Regionalisation Policy. Imports: Imports of Goods and Services. Exports: Exports of Goods and Services. Trade: Imports plus Exports of 
Goods and Services. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PCF: Private Capital Flows. Finopex: Financial Openness Index. Globex: Globalisation Index. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth rate. Pub. Ivt: Public 
Investment. Aid: Foreign Aid or Development Assistance. UEMOA: West African Economic and Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community.  
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Table 5: Interactive regression results for COMESA and EAC (Economic Regions) 
               
 Panel A: The COMESA Region 
 Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
  Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex   Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex  
Constant 1.048*** 1.084*** 1.109*** 0.934*** 0.964*** 0.904*** 0.890*** 111.40*** 113.60*** 118.65*** 97.826*** 101.15*** 94.285*** 92.972*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imports  -0.003* --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.523*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.081)       (0.007)       
Exports --- -0.005** --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.665*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.021)       (0.003)      
Trade --- --- -0.003** --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.390*** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.014)       (0.001)     
FDI --- --- --- -0.022* --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.570** --- --- --- 
    (0.081)       (0.028)    
PCF --- --- --- --- -0.021* --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.437** --- --- 
     (0.082)       (0.030)   
Finopex --- --- --- --- --- -0.035* --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.079** --- 
      (0.074)       (0.025)  
Globex --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.061** --- --- --- --- --- --- -6.790*** 
       (0.020)       (0.005) 
Policy  -0.187*** -0.213*** -0.198*** -0.127*** -0.119*** -0.098*** -0.100*** -19.74*** -22.81*** -21.97*** -14.72*** -13.84*** -10.96*** -11.27*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imports.Policy 0.002* --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.238** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.059)       (0.023)       
Exports.Policy --- 0.003*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.399*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.002)       (0.000)      
Trade.Policy --- --- 0.001** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.161*** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.014)       (0.003)     
FDI.Policy --- --- --- 0.020 --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.658* --- --- --- 
    (0.167)       (0.050)    
PCF.Policy --- --- --- --- 0.016 --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.260* --- --- 
     (0.236)       (0.084)   
Finopex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- 0.031 --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.100* --- 
      (0.174)       (0.054)  
Globex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.056** --- --- --- --- --- --- 6.651*** 
       (0.022)       (0.003) 
GDP growth  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.291 -0.199 -0.221 -0.406 -0.395 -0.402 -0.278 
 (0.380) (0.585) (0.552) (0.176) (0.220) (0.180) (0.317) (0.300) (0.478) (0.438) (0.177) (0.183) (0.181) (0.355) 
Inflation  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.194*** -0.198*** -0.200*** -0.207*** -0.212*** -0.208*** -0.219*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Investment -0.007 -0.010** -0.007 -0.006 -0.008* -0.006 -0.006 0.191 -0.131 0.230 -0.101 -0.239 -0.102 -0.065 
 (0.134) (0.044) (0.176) (0.196) (0.097) (0.196) (0.217) (0.692) (0.774) (0.640) (0.836) (0.621) (0.836) (0.894) 
Foreign Aid -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 -0.004* -0.005** -0.004* -0.004 -0.504** -0.601*** -0.630*** -0.774*** -0.878*** -0.778*** -0.685*** 
 (0.137) (0.072) (0.103) (0.051) (0.015) (0.050) (0.107) (0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Hausman test  6.67 9.73 7.44 7.81 9.06 7.30 9.73 7.44 4.16 6.70 5.91 18.28** 5.80 8.31 
R² within 0.133 0.151 0.155 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.147 0.208 0.224 0.246 0.207 0.206 0.208 0.227 
Fisher 5.34*** 6.17*** 6.40*** 4.73*** 4.83*** 4.76*** 5.35*** 9.08*** 9.99*** 11.42*** 8.10*** 8.18*** 8.12*** 9.11*** 
Observations  259 259 261 233 237 233 233 259 259 261 233 237 233 233 
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 Panel B: The EAC Region 
 Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
  Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex   Imports Exports  Trade  FDI PCF Finopex Globex  
Constant 0.265** 0.557*** 0.426*** 0.435*** 0.424*** 0.316*** 0.239*** 14.870 53.842*** 34.199*** 42.848*** 41.931*** 33.333*** 28.188*** 
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.218) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Imports  0.0002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.540 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.957)       (0.175)       
Exports --- -0.019*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.785*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)       (0.000)      
Trade --- --- -0.004** --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.190 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.045)       (0.406)     
FDI --- --- --- -0.057*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.562** --- --- --- 
    (0.002)       (0.013)    
PCF --- --- --- --- -0.057*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.541** --- --- 
     (0.002)       (0.012)   
Finopex --- --- --- --- --- -0.075*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -6.003** --- 
      (0.002)       (0.012)  
Globex --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.017 --- --- --- --- --- --- -3.657 
       (0.646)       (0.326) 
Policy -0.414 -0.165 -0.372** -0.034 -0.029 0.012 0.002 -17.746 7.914 -14.378 -2.236 -1.383 4.807 4.712 
 (0.107) (0.125) (0.012) (0.611) (0.645) (0.759) (0.959) (0.462) (0.484) (0.330) (0.747) (0.834) (0.253) (0.274) 
Imports.Policy 0.013 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.698 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.125)       (0.401)       
Exports.Policy ---   0.009* --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.014 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.060)       (0.980)      
Trade.Policy --- --- 0.007*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.394 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.008)       (0.170)     
FDI.Policy --- --- --- 0.022 --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.436 --- --- --- 
    (0.301)       (0.133)    
PCF.Policy --- --- --- --- 0.021 --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.194 --- --- 
     (0.302)       (0.141)   
Finopex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- 0.029 --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.367 --- 
      (0.300)       (0.136)  
Globex.Policy --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.034 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.191 
       (0.370)       (0.959) 
GDP growth  0.006 0.015** 0.008 0.015* 0.016* 0.015* 0.013 0.171 1.040 0.221 0.583 0.629 0.607 0.580 
 (0.491) (0.047) (0.366) (0.070) (0.063) (0.066) (0.156) (0.856) (0.193) (0.812) (0.505) (0.471) (0.487) (0.526) 
Inflation  0.0003 0.003** 0.001 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.001 0.075 0.425** 0.183 0.120 0.113 0.117 0.135 
 (0.875) (0.043) (0.472) (0.780) (0.832) (0.806) (0.656) (0.750) (0.037) (0.436) (0.603) (0.623) (0.613) (0.589) 
Public Investment 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 0.046*** 4.212** 3.781*** 3.681*** 2.361 2.383 2.370 3.538** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.135) (0.130) (0.133) (0.036) 
Foreign Aid 0.001 -0.0007 0.003 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.00004 0.0005 0.448 0.587 0.885 0.638 0.669 0.652 0.622 
 (0.849) (0.903) (0.602) (0.962) (0.968) (0.995) (0.942) (0.554) (0.349) (0.194) (0.380) (0.355) (0.369) (0.420) 
Hausman test  5.73* 18.96**** 11.93*** 4.55 4.45 4.49 4.48 12.31*** 21.82*** 17.28*** 9.98*** 9.75*** 9.85*** 10.84*** 
R² within 0.406 0.655 0.490 0.520 0.524 0.522 0.406 0.496 0.634 0.478 0.523 0.525 0.524 0.469 
Fisher 4.40*** 12.24*** 6.45*** 6.99*** 7.08*** 7.05*** 4.41*** 6.33*** 11.16*** 6.16*** 7.06*** 7.11*** 7.09*** 5.69*** 
Observations  55 55 57 55 55 55 55 55 55 57 55 55 55 55 
               
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Policy: Regionalisation Policy. Imports: Imports of Goods and Services. Exports: Exports of Goods and Services. Trade: Imports plus Exports of 
Goods and Services. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PCF: Private Capital Flows. Finopex: Financial Openness Index. Globex: Globalisation Index. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth rate. Pub. Ivt: Public 
Investment. Aid: Foreign Aid or Development Assistance. COMESA: Common Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community.  
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4.2 Robustness checks  
 We employ an alternative estimation technique to assess the robustness of established 
findings. This new technique is different from that used to obtain results in Tables 4-5 in three 
perspectives: (i) an after policy estimate and full sample estimate are directly compared to assess 
the effect of regionalization;  (ii) regressions are based on some consistency in the degree of 
integration from unit root tests and (iii) dependent variables are both in ratios. Appendix 5, 
Appendix 6 and Appendix 7 present the ‘unit root tests’, ‘UEMOA and CEMAC’ and ‘COMESA 
and EAC’ findings respectively.  
 The purpose of the panel unit test is to ensure that variables of the same degree of 
integration (for the most part) within an economic or a monetary region are used in estimations. It 
is essentially to control for this factor that the ECCAS region selected in Table 2 has not been 
further retained because corresponding dependent variables do not have the same order of 
integration.  
 The choice of both homogenous (Levin, Lin & Chu, LLC-2002) and heterogeneous (Im, 
Pesaran & Shin, IPS-2003) panel unit tests is consistent with Hanh (2010). Following Liew 
(2004), optimal lags selection for LLC and IPS tests are determined by Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (HQC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) respectively
11
. Results are 
presented in Appendix 5, with variables without unit roots (stationary) in bold. In accordance 
with Asongu (2014c), the IPS test is given priority in event of conflict of interest
12
.  
 The following can be established after comparing the results of the findings of Tables 4-5 
with those of Appendices 6-7. First, from  Appendix 6: (i) results on the LHS for UEMAO on a 
potential Kuznets shape are confirmed because the ‘after policy’ estimates have negative 
magnitudes while corresponding estimates for the ‘whole sample’ are positive and (ii) concerning 
findings on the RHS for the CEMAC zone, the previously scanty evidence of a Kuznets shape is 
now overwhelmingly confirmed. Second, from Appendix 7, results for COMESA on a potential 
U-shape  are confirmed because the ‘after policy estimates’ have: (i) negative magnitudes of 
lower negative order  while corresponding estimates for the ‘whole sample’ are negative with a 
                         
11
 While the AIC and Final Prediction Error (FPE) more efficiently estimate lags when observations are more or less 
60, the HQC on the other hand, best avoids the underestimation of lags when observations are about 120 and above. 
It is important to disclose that the LLC is based on pooled data.  The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) also 
known as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) presents the short-coming of underestimating lags in the auto 
regression process.   
12
 As articulated by Maddala and Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis of the LLC test (on the absence of a common 
unit root) is too strong.  
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higher order of negative magnitude and (ii) positive magnitudes, while corresponding estimates 
for the ‘whole sample’ are negative.  This conception of positive threshold based on decreasing 
negative magnitude is consistent with Asongu (2014b). The results for the EAC region are not 
significant.  
 
4.3 Further discussion and implications  
 
This section is discussed in five main strands, namely: the sensitivity of globalization 
dynamics; insights into the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis; increasing marginal effects; 
decreasing marginal impacts and policy tools towards fighting surplus liquidity in African 
financial institutions.  
 First, it is apparent from the findings that financial allocation efficiency is more sensitive 
to financial openness compared to trade openness and most sensitive to globalization. This may 
somewhat reflect the narrative in the literature on a less negative impact of trade openness on 
financial development, compared to financial openness. In essence, whereas there is some 
consensus in the literature on the beneficial effects of trade globalization, the impact of financial 
globalization on financial development remains an object of heated debate (see Asongu, 2014b).  
 Second, contrary to the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis which stipulates that the 
beneficial effects in financial development from globalization are more apparent when trade and 
capital accounts are liberalized simultaneously, we are consistent with Baltagi et al. (2009) and 
Hanh (2010) in partially rejecting the underlying hypothesis. Hence, we establish that trade 
openness and financial openness are independent significant determinants of bank sector 
efficiency or inefficiency.  
 Third, the increasing marginal effects from globalization-fuelled regionalization in 
financial allocation efficiency established from the COMESA region substantiates the stream of 
literature that has confirmed the importance of openness in financial development (Kandiero & 
Chitiga, 2003; Mbabazi et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2010). This includes African specific studies on 
the importance of regional integration in stock (Okeahalam, 2001; Irving, 2005; Yartey & Adjasi, 
2007) and financial intermediary (Wakeman-Linn & Wagh, 2008) market developments.  
 Fourth, the increasing marginal effects supports the views of a strand of the literature 
which argues that regionalization has not increased banking competitive pressures to the benefit 
of regional banks (Claessens et al., 2001; Peria et al., 2003; Shumkler, 2004). According to this 
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argument, regionalization from a financial view-point has increased asymmetric information 
which remains an important concern for lenders (banks) who might not always have a good 
knowledge of what exactly economic operators intent to do with borrowed funds, especially if the 
project/activity is to be implemented across national borders. This has greatly affected 
intermediation efficiency because savings are not fully exploited by financial institutions. This 
discourse also aligns with the stream of literature suggesting that some initial conditions may be 
essential in order to materialize the financial development benefits from globalization (see Henry, 
2007; Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014b; Asongu & De Moor, 2015ab). As a policy implication, 
‘public information sharing’ offices like ‘public credit registries’ and ‘private credit bureaus’ 
which contribute to reducing information asymmetry may be relevant initial conditions for the 
rewards in financial allocation efficiency from globalization-fuelled regionalization policies.  
 It is reasonable to infer from our findings that whereas for UEMOA and CEMAC, 
globalization-fuelled regionalization has decreased the ability of the financial intermediary sector 
to provide funds for investment projects, COMESA has experienced the opposite effect while 
findings for the EAC are inconclusive or insignificant. It follows that regionalization for the most 
part has not been instrumental in financial intermediary efficiency over the past decades. Hence, 
our results reveal ‘economic and monetary’ regions have more surplus liquidity than purely 
economic regions. Therefore, the impact of globalization may be more detrimental to ‘economic 
and monetary’ regions (UEMOA and CEMAC) than to purely economic regions (COMESA and 
EAC)
13
.  This inference is consistent with documented issues of surplus liquidity in the FCFA 
zone (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009) and recent findings from Price and Elu (2014) which have 
shown that African countries within the FCFA zone were more likely to experience credit 
contraction during the recent financial crisis.  
 Fifth, consistent with Asongu (2014a, p. 70), we provide some policy directions on how 
to fight surplus liquidity in sampled countries. In essence, the holding of excess cash could be 
either voluntary or involuntary. First, involuntary holding of surplus liquidity can be mitigated 
by: (i) reducing the lending inability of banks, especially in scenarios of regulated interest rates; 
(ii) providing an enabling environment  that encourages the spread of reserves and bonds in order 
to enable commercial banks invest surplus cash in bond markets; (iii) establishing mechanisms 
that reduce information asymmetry and enhance competition  in order to limit the unwillingness 
                         
13
 Should we increase the significance level for the EAC, the sign-effect of the globalization parameter would satisfy 
this inference.  
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of financial institutions to lend and (iv) developing regional stock markets that contribute towards 
availing more investment opportunities to commercial banks. Second, the voluntary holding of 
surplus liquidity can be reduced by: (i) easing constraints financial institutions face in tracking 
their positions within central banks, which may ultimately require them to hold cash above 
statutory limits; (ii) consolidating institutions that are favorable to interbank lending in order to 
facilitate interbank borrowing for contingency motives and (iii) improving infrastructure so that 
bank branches in remote areas are not obliged to hold excess cash because of  logistical and 
infrastructural issues.  
 
5. Conclusion and future directions  
 The study assesses the role of globalization-fuelled regionalization policies on financial 
allocation efficiency in four economic and monetary regions in Africa for the period 1980 to 
2008. Banking system and financial system efficiencies are used as dependent variables whereas 
seven bundled and unbundled globalization variables are employed as independent indicators. 
The bundling exercise is achieved by means of principal component analysis while the empirical 
evidence is based on interactive Fixed Effects regressions. The following findings are 
established. First, financial allocation efficiency is more sensitive to financial openness compared 
to trade openness and most sensitive to globalization. The relationship between allocation 
efficiency and globalization-fuelled regionalization policies is: (i) Kuznets or inverted U-shape in 
the UEMOA and CEMAC zones (evidence of decreasing returns to allocation efficiency from 
globalization-fuelled regionalization) and (ii) U-shape overwhelmingly in the COMESA and 
scantily in the EAC (increasing returns to allocation efficiency from globalization-fuelled 
regionalization). Established shapes are relevant to specific globalization dynamics within 
regions. ‘Economic and monetary’ regions are more prone to surplus liquidity than purely 
economic regions. Policy implications and measures of fighting surplus liquidity have been 
discussed.  
 Further research devoted to enriching the extant literature could focus on directly 
assessing the interactive effect of trade openness and financial openness on financial allocation 
efficiency in order to investigate the hypothesis of simultaneous trade and financial 
liberalizations as an essential condition for rewards in financial allocation efficiency.  
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       Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables  
Variable(s) Definitions of Variables (Measurements) Source(s) 
   
Banking efficiency  Bank system credit on Financial system deposits  FDSD (World 
Bank) 
  
Financial efficiency Financial system credit on Financial system deposits (%) 
   
Imports  Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADI (World Bank) 
  
Exports  Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
  
Trade Globalisation  Imports plus Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
  
Foreign investment  Gross Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
  
Private Capital Flows Gross Private Capital Flows (% of GDP) 
  
Financial Globalisation First PC of Foreign Investment and Private Capital Flows  
  
Globalisation  First PC of Financial Globalisation  and Trade Globalisation  
  
Economic growth  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth (annual %) 
  
Inflation  Annual Consumer Price Index  
  
Public Investment  Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) 
  
Foreign Aid Total Development Assistances (% of GDP) 
   
PC: Principal Component. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. ADI: African Development 
Indicators  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Openness and financial  data 
 
Variables 
Panel A: Globalization (Openness) 
Financial  Openness(F.O) Trade Openness(T.O) 
GPCFgdp GFDIgdp Finopex Igdp Xgdp Tropex 
 
 
Definitions 
Gross Private 
Capital Flows 
on GDP 
Gross 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
on GDP 
Financial 
Openness Index 
Imports 
on GDP 
Exports 
on GDP 
Imports plus 
Exports on 
GDP 
Sources  ADI ADI PCA ADI ADI ADI 
Usages in the 
Openness 
literature 
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2006), Baltagi et al. (2009), 
Hanh(2010) 
Gries et al.(2009)  
Standard Proxies  
Hanh(2010), 
Gries et 
al.(2009) 
 
 
Variables  
         Panel B: Principal Financial Development Indicators 
Depth Efficiency Size Activity DESA-1 
llgdp bcbd dbacba prdcgdp Findex1 
 
Definitions 
Liquid 
liability on 
GDP 
Bank Credit 
on Bank 
Deposits 
Deposit bank 
assets on Total 
financial  assets  
Private credit by 
domestic banks on 
GDP 
Financial 
development 
Index1 
Sources FDSD FDSD FDSD FDSD PCA 
Usages in the 
Financial 
development 
literature 
Hanh (2010), 
Gries et 
al.(2009) 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1999), 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Beck (2009) 
Baltagi et al. (2009),  
Hanh(2010) 
Gries et 
al.(2009) 
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Variables 
Panel C: Robustness tests financial development Indicators 
Depth Efficiency Size Activity DESA-2 
fdgdp prdcfsd         ? prdcofgdp Findex 2 
Definitions Financial 
system 
deposits on 
GDP 
Private 
domestic 
credit on 
financial 
system 
deposit 
 Private credit from 
domestic banks and 
other financial 
institutions 
Financial 
development 
index 
Sources FDSD FDSD         ? FDSD PCA 
Usages in the 
literature/ 
justification 
Authors 
correlation 
analysis 
Authors 
correlation 
analysis 
        ? Authors correlation 
analysis 
Gries et al. 
(2009) 
ADI: African Development Indicators.   PCA: Principal Component   Analysis.  FDSD: Financial Development and 
Structure Database. 
 
Appendix 3:  Summary Statistics  
           
 UEMOA CEMAC 
 Mean S.D Min. Max Obs. Mean S.D Min. Max Obs. 
Banking System Efficiency 1.248 0.604 0.338 3.698 145 0.806 0.298 0.188 1.601 57 
Financial System Efficiency  117.52 48.413 41.300 234.39 125 79.493 27.865 22.20 160.70 53 
Imports 33.055 6.929 17.836 51.780 138 35.685 15.507 14.639 74.219 56 
Exports  24.823 9.984 13.319 52.650 138 49.452 22.803 16.179 86.884 56 
Trade Globalisation  59.015 13.678 32.781 95.007 142 86.026 36.722 31.745 156.861 57 
Foreign Investment  1.018 1.421 -2.496 7.246 136 2.609 7.225 -8.629 34.507 47 
Private Capital Flows  0.975 1.545 -2.517 8.849 135 2.665 7.065 -8.918 34.488 47 
Financial Globalisation  -0.001 1.380 -2.929 6.701 135 0.000 1.412 -2.259 6.306 47 
Globalisation   0.062 1.009 -1.973 4.032 135 -0.014 1.175 -1.285 3.762 47 
Economic Growth  2.583 4.264 -16.825 12.100 145 2.203 3.549 -8.932 7.700 57 
Inflation 4.571 7.486 -7.796 38.530 130 4.121 9.144 -11.686 42.439 55 
Public Investment  6.758 3.093 1.853 20.358 123 4.733 2.902 0.759 13.716 57 
Foreign Aid 11.361 5.645 0.557 28.823 145 4.449 4.591 -0.174 23.418 57 
           
           
 COMESA EAC 
 Mean S.D Min. Max Obs. Mean S.D Min. Max Obs. 
Banking System Efficiency 0.711 0.283 0.275 1.876 287 0.588 0.185 0.206 1.075 57 
Financial System Efficiency  76.392 33.572 30.532 200.079 276 62.121 18.783 22.767 111.830 57 
Imports 37.540 21.921 7.066 114.046 288 29.340 6.486 19.098 47.707 55 
Exports  27.569 21.778 3.335 104.213 288 18.508 7.441 7.062 38.903 55 
Trade Globalisation  64.424 42.170 11.087 202.849 290 48.225 13.260 26.609 72.858 57 
Foreign Investment  1.429 2.222 -4.302 9.708 260 2.016 1.827 0.000 6.470 55 
Private Capital Flows  1.415 2.271 -4.322 9.611 264 1.971 1.893 -0.253 6.688 55 
Financial Globalisation  0.006 1.410 -3.610 5.186 260 0.000 1.413 -1.539 3.484 55 
Globalisation   0.012 1.134 -1.498 4.366 260 -0.024 1.113 -1.903 2.876 55 
Economic Growth  3.790 5.780 -50.248 35.224 286 4.974 2.732 -0.799 11.523 57 
Inflation 21.859 32.028 -2.405 200.026 280 13.023 10.753 -0.287 45.978 57 
Public Investment  6.999 3.410 0.000 17.451 268 5.559 1.851 2.492 10.452 57 
Foreign Aid 12.015 10.534 -0.251 94.442 290 12.294 6.280 2.407 28.992 57 
           
UEMOA: West African Economic and Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community. COMESA: Common 
Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community. S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: 
Observations.  
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Appendix 4: Correlation matrices  
              
 Panel  A: UEMOA 
 Imports Exports Trade FDI PCF Finopex Globex GDPg Pub. Ivt Inflation Aid BcBd FcFd 
Imports 1.000             
Exports 0.520 1.000            
Trade 0.810 0.862 1.000           
FDI 0.313 0.290 0.375 1.000          
PCF 0.286 0.273 0.329 0.867 1.000         
Finopex 0.310 0.292 0.364 0.965 0.967 1.000        
Globex 0.661 0.699 0.773 0.831 0.819 0.854 1.000       
GDPg 0.099 -0.156 -0.010 0.203 0.167 0.191 0.092 1.000      
Pub. Ivt 0.105 -0.290 -0.168 0.081 0.047 0.066 -0.034 0.002 1.000     
Inflation 0.225 0.130 0.252 -0.030 -0.045 -0.039 0.089 -0.059 0.129 1.000    
Aid -0.211 -0.627 -0.566 -0.156 -0.149 -0.158 -0.391 0.265 0.236 0.124 1.000   
BcBd 0.245 0.325 0.235 -0.208 -0.149 -0.184 0.061 -0.361 0.061 0.052 -0.356 1.000  
FcFd 0.243 0.344 0.241 -0.233 -0.182 -0.215 0.047 -0.400 0.048 0.094 -0.334 0.985 1.000 
              
              
Panel B: CEMAC 
 Imports Exports Trade FDI PCF Finopex Globex GDPg Pub. Ivt Inflation Aid BcBd FcFd 
Imports 1.000             
Exports 0.878 1.000            
Trade 0.935 0.967 1.000           
FDI 0.383 0.355 0.457 1.000          
PCF 0.395 0.369 0.473 0.994 1.000         
Finopex 0.390 0.363 0.466 0.998 0.998 1.000        
Globex 0.799 0.801 0.865 0.834 0.842 0.839 1.000       
GDPg 0.177 0.179 0.206 -0.015 0.004 -0.005 0.104 1.000      
Pub. Ivt 0.703 0.651 0.689 0.328 0.368 0.348 0.620 0.163 1.000     
Inflation 0.022 0.005 0.0007 -0.028 -0.033 -0.030 -0.011 0.073 -0.014 1.000    
Aid 0.060 -0.088 -0.008 0.093 0.078 0.085 0.032 0.219 0.0008 0.235 1.000   
BcBd -0.076 -0.278 -0.279 -0.241 -0.249 -0.245 -0.274 -0.457 -0.080 -0.135 -0.024 1.000  
FcFd -0.164 -0.317 -0.347 -0.285 -0.299 -0.292 -0.337 -0.493 -0.1264 -0.114 -0.014 0.925 1.000 
              
              
Panel C: COMESA  
 Imports Exports Trade FDI PCF Finopex Globex GDPg Pub. Ivt Inflation Aid BcBd FcFd 
Imports 1.000             
Exports 0.944 1.000            
Trade 0.979 0.985 1.000           
FDI 0.221 0.241 0.235 1.000          
PCF 0.214 0.234 0.229 0.980 1.000         
Finopex 0.218 0.238 0.233 0.995 0.995 1.000        
Globex 0.772 0.784 0.787 0.778 0.774 0.780 1.000       
GDPg 0.114 0.116 0.130 0.244 0.245 0.246 0.230 1.000      
Pub. Ivt 0.165 0.082 0.133 -0.043 -0.033 -0.038 0.056 -0.083 1.000     
Inflation -0.225 0.199 -0.212 -0.107 -0.103 -0.106 -0.205 -0.070 -0.230 1.000    
Aid -0.317 -0.464 -0.408 -0.106 -0.091 -0.099 -0.317 -0.157 0.372 -0.001 1.000   
BcBd 0.056 0.036 0.043 -0.256 -0.264 -0.261 -0.135 -0.205 -0.205 0.087 -0.058 1.000  
FcFd -0.032 -0.079 -0.062 -0.282 -0.288 -0.286 -0.217 -0.238 0.191 -0.305 0.087 0.899 1.000 
              
              
Panel D: EAC  
 Imports Exports Trade FDI PCF Finopex Globex GDPg Pub. Ivt Inflation Aid BcBd FcFd 
Imports 1.000             
Exports 0.567 1.000            
Trade 0.857 0.879 1.000           
FDI -0.311 -0.258 -0.328 1.000          
PCF -0.319 -0.283 -0.349 0.996 1.000         
Finopex -0.316 -0.271 -0.339 0.999 0.999 1.000        
Globex -0.689 -0.679 -0.768 0.848 0.859 0.854 1.000       
GDPg -0.397 -0.424 -0.421 0.549 0.558 0.554 0.628 1.000      
Pub. Ivt 0.204 0.033 0.149 -0.397 -0.378 -0.388 -0.331 -0.278 1.000     
Inflation 0.409 0.191 0.335 -0.413 -0.406 -0.410 -0.457 -0.425 0.499 1.000    
Aid 0.040 -0.502 -0.274 0.074 0.111 0.093 0.218 0.091 0.544 0.493 1.000   
BcBd 0.358 0.295 0.403 -0.712 -0.719 -0.716 -0.683 -0.344 0.483 0.318 -0.135 1.000  
FcFd 0.393 0.267 0.420 -0.617 -0.624 -0.621 -0.620 -0.317 0.521 0.346 -0.057 0.942 1.000 
              
Imports: Imports of Goods and Services. Exports: Exports of Goods and Services. Trade: Imports plus Exports of Goods and Services. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. PCF: Private Capital Flows. Finopex: Financial Openness Index. Globex: Globalisation Index. GDPg: Gross Domestic 
Product Growth rate. Pub. Ivt: Public Investment. Aid: Foreign Aid or Development Assistance. BcBd: Banking system credit on banking system 
deposits for Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial system credit on financial system deposits for Financial System Efficiency. UEMOA: 
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West African Economic and Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community. COMESA: Common Markets for 
Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community.  
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Appendix 5: Homogenous and heterogeneous panel unit root tests 
Z
on
es 
 
Vbles 
 
Homogenous(LLC) tests Heterogeneous(IPS) tests  Homogenous(LLC) tests Heterogeneous(IPS) tests 
Level First diff. Level First diff.  Level First diff. Level First diff. 
c ct c ct c ct c ct  c ct c ct c ct c ct 
 
 
 
U 
E 
M
O 
A 
FDIgdp -2.90***   -3.01*** n.a n.a -3.89*** -4.68*** n.a n.a  
 
C 
E 
M 
A 
C 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.78** -2.97*** n.a n.a -1.18 -1.16 -6.24*** -5.05*** 
PCFgdp -2.86*** -2.79*** n.a n.a -4.87*** -4.92*** n.a n.a -1.83** -2.92*** n.a n.a -0.73 -0.67 -5.09*** -3.29*** 
Finopex -1.90** -2.46*** n.a n.a -3.40*** -4.26*** n.a n.a -1.72** -3.10*** n.a n.a -0.91 -0.88 -5.62*** -4.40*** 
Igdp -1.55* -2.34*** n.a n.a -2.24** -1.60* n.a n.a -1.36* -1.87** n.a n.a -0.60 -0.83 -3.94*** -4.35*** 
Xgdp -2.42*** -3.03*** n.a n.a -1.57* -1.42* n.a n.a -0.32 0.86 -4.06*** -3.71*** 0.09 0.17 -4.38*** -3.26*** 
Tropex 2.05 1.53 -9.47*** -6.67*** 0.96 1.74 -7.03*** -5.67*** 3.18 4.31 -1.43* -1.19 1.17 2.31 -2.31** -1.42* 
Globex -1.100 -0.720 -9.72*** -8.91*** -1.90** -1.40* n.a n.a -1.98** -3.32*** n.a n.a -0.78 -1.35* -5.99*** -4.66*** 
GDPg -8.52*** -6.84*** n.a n.a -7.20*** -6.18*** n.a n.a -3.52*** -1.82** n.a n.a -3.66*** -2.16** n.a n.a 
GDPpcg -6.70*** -6.89*** n.a n.a -6.94*** -6.12*** n.a n.a -3.45*** -1.77** n.a n.a -3.61*** -2.05** n.a n.a 
bcbd -5.76*** -6.22*** n.a n.a -6.49*** -4.67*** n.a n.a -1.37* 3.37 n.a n.a -1.46* -0.82 n.a n.a 
prdcfsd -2.02** 0.18 n.a n.a -0.55 0.63 n.a n.a -3.25*** -5.63*** n.a n.a -2.37*** -4.79*** n.a n.a 
 
 
 
C 
O
M 
E 
S 
A 
 
FDIgdp -1.04 -2.90** 21.58 -4.38*** -2.97*** -4.10*** n.a n.a  
 
 
 
E 
A 
C 
-1.58* -1.58* n.a n.a -1.40* -0.77 -4.43*** -3.12*** 
PCFgdp -1.87** -3.54*** n.a n.a -3.15*** -4.60*** n.a n.a -1.54* -2.16** n.a n.a -1.11 -0.93 -5.14*** -3.85*** 
Finopex -1.41* -3.18*** n.a n.a -3.04*** -3.97*** n.a n.a -1.63* -2.53*** n.a n.a -4.46*** -3.08*** n.a n.a 
Igdp -1.09 -3.04*** -12.0*** -9.78*** -1.32* -2.92*** n.a n.a 2.05 0.06 -4.17*** -2.90*** 2.13 0.19 -4.45*** -3.61*** 
Xgdp -2.03** -3.52*** n.a n.a -3.14*** -3.45*** n.a n.a -0.12 -0.55 -5.13*** -5.17*** -0.66 -1.55* -5.38*** -4.95*** 
Tropex -0.79 -5.29*** -9.16*** -4.91*** -2.59*** -4.96*** n.a n.a 2.45 -0.30 -4.32*** -2.64*** 2.06 -0.95 -5.06*** -4.37*** 
Globex 2.21 8.66 27.08 -6.45*** -1.89** -4.33*** n.a n.a -1.02 -1.58* -3.05*** -2.39*** -0.59 -1.45* -3.48*** -2.09** 
GDPg -9.62*** -8.63*** n.a n.a -9.17*** -9.30*** n.a n.a -1.61* -1.71** n.a n.a -1.45* -2.57*** n.a n.a 
GDPpcg -8.61*** -6.25*** n.a n.a -8.98*** -9.40*** n.a n.a -1.49* -4.49*** n.a n.a -1.25 -3.95*** -7.09*** -5.48*** 
bcbd -8.48*** -6.05*** n.a n.a -8.98*** -9.36*** n.a n.a -2.58*** -0.10 n.a n.a -2.18** 1.85 n.a n.a 
prdcfsd -2.88*** 4.76 n.a n.a -2.61*** -0.90 n.a n.a -3.17*** -1.75** n.a n.a -2.51*** 0.15 n.a n.a 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Optimal lag selection is governed by AIC and H&Q for IPS and LLC tests respectively. Maximum lags applied are based on time series length: with 3 for ‘UEMOA and 
COMESA’ and 2 for ‘CEMAC, ECCAS and EAC’.  7 lags are applied on ‘ prdcfsd’ for COMESA . ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ ;respectively. n.a: not applicable. Stationary series are in bold and decision rule 
depends on both tests but priority is given the IPS in case of conflict of interest. LLC; Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). First diff: First difference. Vbles: variables.   
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Appendix 6: Regressions results for UEMOA and CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Regions) 
Regions UEMOA CEMAC 
Estimated 
Parameters 
Main Models (Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests (Financial System Efficiency) Main Models (Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests(Financial System Efficiency) 
Model  1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* Model  1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* 
Constant 0.945*** 1.106*** 1.52*** 1.23*** 0.632*** 0.544*** 1.51*** 1.36*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 0.78*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.03*** 0.86*** 
 (3.947) (4.508) (25.01) (22.73) (4.328) (4.100) (30.40) (29.41) (16.09) (17.08) (17.84) (20.37) (14.57) (14.21) (14.98) (17.90) 
FDIgdp --- -0.025 --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- --- 0.011 --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- 
  (-0.559)    (0.298)    (1.324)    (0.801)   
a FDIgdp --- 0.025 --- --- --- 0.023 --- --- --- -0.023** --- --- --- -0.015* --- --- 
  (0.385)    (0.580)    (-2.528)    (-1.759)   
PCFgdp -0.029 --- --- --- -0.008 --- --- --- 0.017* --- --- --- 0.011 --- --- --- 
 (-0.698)    (-0.242)    (1.990)    (1.420)    
aPCFgdp 0.059 --- --- --- 0.042 --- --- --- -0,02*** --- --- --- -0.022** --- --- --- 
 (1.036)    (1.046)    (-2.732)    (-2.489)    
Finop --- --- -0.041 --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- --- 0.079* --- --- --- 0.035 --- 
   (-0.895)    (0.216)    (1.945)    (0.894)  
aFinop --- --- 0.093 --- --- --- 0.049 --- --- --- -0.15*** --- --- --- -0.113** --- 
   (1.483)    (0.939)    (-3.338)    (-2.412)  
Igdp 0.020*** --- --- --- 0.029*** --- --- --- -0.006 --- --- --- -0.012* --- --- --- 
 (2.83)    (6.350)    (-0.888)    (-1.823)    
aIgdp -0.02*** --- --- --- -0.02*** --- --- --- -0.004* --- --- --- -0.006** --- --- --- 
 (-8.41)    (-11.85)    -1.748    (-2.380)    
Xgdp --- 0.021* --- --- --- 0.040*** --- --- --- -0.009 --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- 
  (1.943)    (7.380)    (-1.263)    (0.187)   
aXgdp --- -0.02*** --- --- --- -0.03*** --- --- --- -0.001* --- --- --- -0.004** --- --- 
  (-6.557)    (-13.69)    (-1.802)    (-2.456)   
Tropex --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- 0.006* --- --- --- -0.014** --- --- --- -0.01* --- 
   (0.764)    (1.855)    (-2.359)    (-1.699)  
aTropex --- --- -0.01*** --- --- --- -0.01*** --- --- --- -0.002*** --- --- --- -0.003*** --- 
   (-8.040)    (-9.37)    (-3.542)    (-3.125)  
Globex --- --- --- -0.147 --- --- --- 0.18** --- --- --- 0.089 --- --- --- -0.000 
    (-1.504)    (2.244)    (1.093)    (-0.008) 
aGlobex --- --- --- (-0.032) --- --- --- -0.27*** --- --- --- -0.164** ---   -0.096 
    0.027    (-3.034)    (-2.438)  --- --- (-1.230)  
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.02*** -0.016** -0.017** -0.013 --- --- --- --- -0.037** -0.042** -0.040*** -0.022 
     (-3.081) (-2.528) (-1.983) (-1.202)     (-2.532) (-2.716) (-2,749) (-1.567) 
aGDPg --- --- --- --- 0.032** 0.018* 0.020 -0.05*** --- --- --- --- 0.013 0.015 0.014 --- 
     (2.599) (1.664) (1.503) (-3.24)     (0.678) (0.762) (0.719)  
GDPpcg -0.03*** -0.027** -0.021* -0.05*** --- --- --- --- -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.028* --- --- --- --- 
 (-2.75) (-2.36) (-1.893) (-3.97)     (-1.261) (-1.439) (-1.471) (-1.714)     
aGDPpcg 0.034 0.014 0.021 0.027 --- --- --- --- -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.009 --- --- --- --- 
 (1.49) (0,592) (0.980) (0.960)     (-0.738) (-0.783) (-0.763) (-0.414)     
R² ajust. 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.19 0.77 0.80 0.69 0.45 0.26 0.29 0.37 0.15 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.14 
F-Stats 14.87*** 12.08*** 12.72*** 5.11*** 39.63*** 48.01*** 27.13*** 13.29*** 2.96** 3.25*** 4.21*** 2.32* 3.55*** 3.01** 3.68*** 2.17* 
*, **, *** denote respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Estimated parameters with ‘a’ represent after policy implications to banking and financial system efficiencies. UEMOA: West African 
Economic and Monetary Union.  CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community.  
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Appendix 7: Regression results for COMESA and EAC (Economic regions) 
Regions COMESA EAC 
Estimated 
Parameters 
Main Models(Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests (Financial System Efficiency) Main Models(Banking System Efficiency) Robustness tests(Financial System Efficiency) 
Model  1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* Model1 Model2 Model 3 Model 4 Model1* Model2* Model3* Model4* 
Constant 0.89*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.70*** 1.02*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.76*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.58*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.61*** 0.67*** 
 (12.45) (12.95) (10.80) (49.61) (15.30) (15.02) (12.68) (41.88) (24.68) (24.29) (24.88) (25.50) (14.13) (13.78) (14.31) (14.54) 
FDIgdp --- -0.015 --- --- --- -0.015 --- --- --- -0.007 --- --- --- -0.003 --- --- 
  (-1.049)    (-1.094)    (-0.430)    (-0.20)   
a FDIgdp --- 0.013 --- --- --- 0.021 --- --- --- -0.023 --- --- --- -0.006 --- --- 
  (0.865)    (1.378)    (-0.912)    (-0.193)   
PCFgdp -0.026** --- --- --- -0.027** --- --- --- -0.004 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- 
 (-2.00)    (-2.232)    (-0.245)    (-0.008)    
aPCFgdp 0.028* --- --- --- 0.035** --- --- --- -0.018 --- --- --- -0.009 --- --- --- 
 (1.909)    (2.57)    (-0.756)    (-0.318)    
Finop --- --- -0.05*** --- --- --- -0.05*** --- --- --- -0.08*** --- --- --- -0.08*** --- 
   (-2.684)    (-3.101)    (-4,189)    (-4.438)  
aFinop --- --- 0.064*** --- --- --- 0.08*** --- --- --- 0.047 --- --- -- 0.056 --- 
   (2.868)    (3.925)    (1.325)    (1.510)  
Igdp -0.003* --- --- --- -0.005*** --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- --- 
 (-1.759)    (-2.716)    (1.152)    (1.251)    
aIgdp -0.001** --- --- --- -0.002*** ---  --- -0.000 --- --- --- -0.001 --- --- --- 
 (-2.586)    (-2.837)    (-0.255)    (-0.412)    
Xgdp --- -0.004* --- --- --- -0.005** --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- --- 0.005 --- --- 
  (-1.703)    (-2.048)    (0.248)    (0.796)   
aXgdp --- -0.001 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- 0.000 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- 
  (-1.012)    (-0.544)    (0.094)    (-0.176)   
Tropex --- --- -0.001 --- ---  -0.002** --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- 0.000 --- 
   (-1.619)    (-2.056)    (-0.279)    (0.203)  
aTropex --- --- -0.000 --- ---  -0.000 --- --- --- -0.000 --- --- --- -0.000 --- 
   (-1.565)    (-1.164)    (-0.226)    (-0.384)  
Globex --- --- --- -0.08*** ---   -0.08*** --- --- --- 0.003 --- --- --- -0.002 
    (-3.319)    (-3.608)    (0.108)    (-0.064) 
aGlobex --- --- ---- 0.06*** ---   0.10*** --- --- --- 1.544 --- --- --- 0.011 
    (2.773)    (4.239)    (0.000)    (0.357) 
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 8,10 --- --- --- --- -0.018* -0.017 -0.007 -0.017 
     (-1.642) (-0.874) (-1.082) (0.021)     (-1.751) (-1.613) (-0.769) (-1.679) 
aGDPg --- --- --- --- 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008* --- --- --- --- 0.005 0.000 0.005 -0.003 
     (0.416) (-1.186) (-0.304) (-1.809)     (0.207) (0.021) (0.271) (-0.508) 
GDPpcg -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.008* --- --- --- --- -0.014 -0.016 -0.001 -0.013 --- --- --- --- 
 (-2.805) (-2.735) (-2.601) (-1.917)     (-1.386) (-1.526) (-0.113) (-1.278)     
aGDPpcg 0.01*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.008 --- --- --- --- 0.017 0.021 0.010 0.003 --- --- --- --- 
 (2.602) (2.104) (2.255) (1.451)     (0.643) (0.789) (0.470) (0.267)     
R² ajust. 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.62 0.48 0.56 0.54 0.68 0.54 
F-Stats 15.70*** 14.28*** 15.31*** 16.86*** 31.24*** 25.72*** 27.60*** 31.10*** 7.41*** 7.03*** 11.56*** 8.86*** 9.03*** 8.62*** 14.68*** 11.36*** 
*, **, *** denote respectively, 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. Estimated parameters with ‘a’ represent after policy implications to banking and financial system efficiencies.  COMESA: Common 
Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa. EAC: East African Community. 
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